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Abstract 
 
MANETs are considered as suitable for commercial applications such 
as law enforcement, conference meeting, and sharing information in 
a student classroom and critical services such as military operations, 
disaster relief, and rescue operations. Meanwhile, in military 
operation especially in the battlefield in freely medium which 
naturally needs high mobility and flexibility. Thus, applying MANETs 
make these networks vulnerable to various types of attacks such 
aspacket eavesdropping, data disseminating, message replay, 
message modification, and especially privacy issue. In this paper, we 
propose a secure communication and information exchange in 
MANET with considering secure adhoc routing and secure 
information exchange. Regarding privacy issue or anonymity, we use 
a reliable asymmetric encryption which protecting user privacy by 
utilizing insensitive user attributes as user identity, CP-ABE 
(Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption) cryptographic 
scheme. We also design protocols to implement the proposed scheme 
for various battlefied scenarios in real evironment using embedded 
devices. Our experimental results showed that the additional of 
HMAC (Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code) and AES 
(Advanced Encryption standard) schemes using processor 1.2GHz 
only take processing time about 4.452 ms,  we can confirm that our 
approach by using CP-ABE with added HMAC and AES schemes make 
low overhead. 
  
Keywords: MANET, Attribute-Based Encryption, Information 
Confidentiality and Integrity. 
  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Communication systems using mobile devices such as smartphones,   
laptops, and embedded devices have become an integral part in modern era. 
Recently, mobile devices have bundled with wireless card which may directly 
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communicate with others like exchanging data or information, even without 
any constructed the fixed infrastructure or internet connection. This network 
is commonly known as an Ad-hoc Network. When it is formed by collection of 
mobile devices, it is called a  MANETs (Mobile Ad-hoc Networks)[1][8][9]. In 
MANETs, mobile devices can reach any other mobile device which are outside 
their range through the intermediate nodes by multi-hop or multiple relaying 
system over a dynamic topology. Furthermore, the mobility, flexibility and 
scalability are also the advantages of MANETs. 
Due to their characteristics, MANETs are considered as suitable for 
commercial applications such as law enforcement, conference meeting, and 
sharing information in a student classroom and critical services like military 
operations, disaster relief, and rescue operations[12]. The need for 
exchanging information in military operations is very important such as 
strategy or tactic commands from captain, ammunition status or health 
condition from all participants in the battlefield. Meanwhile, battlefield 
operationin freely medium which naturally needs high mobility and 
flexibility [14][16][17]. Thus, by applying MANETs make these networks 
vulnerable to various types of attacks. The attacks include packet 
eavesdropping, data disseminating, message replay, message modification, 
and denial of service[1][12]. 
Table 1. Security issues in mobile adhoc network [1] 
Layer Security issues Attacks 
Application layer 
Detecting and preventing 
viruses, worms, malicious 
codes, and application 
abuses 
Repudiation, data corruption 
Transport layer 
Authenticating and securing 
end-to-end communications 
through data encryption 
Session hijacking, SYN 
flooding 
Network layer 
Protecting the adhoc routing 
and forwarding protocols 
Wormhole, blackhole, 
byzantine, flooding, resource 
consumption, location 
disclosure 
Link layer 
Protecting the wireless MAC 
protocol and providing link-
layer security support 
Traffic analysis, monitoring, 
disruption MAC(802.11), 
WEP weakness 
Physical layer 
Preventing signal jamming 
denial-of-service attacks 
Jamming, interceptions, 
eavesdropping 
As mentioned in [1], The security goals for MANETs is to provide some 
security services, such asauthentication, confidentiality, integrity,access 
control, non-repudiation and availability. Each layer has a different attack 
vulnerability. Table 1 describes the security issues and various attacks in 
each layer.Used  single security in a system will not fully protect from 
unauthorized data breaches. Therefore, the security solution should provide 
full protection in all layers, but the importance layer must be secure are 
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network and application layers [1]. Many researchers have worked on 
securing mobile ad-hoc networks mainly focus onthe link layer [9][10] and 
network layer[12][13][16]. They fulfill different security requirements and 
prevent specific attacks. [9] developed a cross-layer security solution based 
on cooperation between routing and MAC layers using hash function SHA-1 
and MD5 under OLSR routing protocol. However, they only addressed one of 
the attacks targeting neighbor discovery phase in OLSR. This attack is 
launched atrouting level by implementing a VLINK attack (Virtual Link) 
leading to establish false symmetric link between the targeted nodes 
connected via an asymmetric link. [8] proposed secure content delivery in 
CCMANET (Content Centric MANET) with end-to-end authentication 
mechanism using Yaksha system digital signature algorithm, the variant of 
the RSA public-key crypto system. However, the anonymity and control 
access features are not provided. 
Anonymity should be one important part of the overall solution for 
truly secure mobile ad-hoc networks, especially in certain privacy-vital 
environments. For example, in a battlefield, we do not want only to ensure 
that adversaries are not able to disclose the contentof our communications 
(i.e., confidentiality) or disable the communications (i.e., availability and 
integrity), but also expect that the parties’ identities in communications are 
anonymous from adversaries. Otherwise, adversaries may deduce important 
information about the location or the mobility model of communicating 
parties, which can be used to locate the target of their physical attacks at a 
later time. 
Meanwhile, from a variety of possible attacks described in Table 1, 
sensitive information is the primary target, either by interception or data 
modification. Therefore, it is needed for restrictions on the right of access 
only to authorized users. Moreover, the distribution of data through internet 
network. So, keeping the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of data is a 
fundamental security solution in MANET application layers. [18] proposed 
secure authentication scheme in device-to-device connection (D2D) in two 
scenarios with a secure initial key establishment using CP-ABE. Practically, 
they implemented the scheme in mobile multi-hop networks environment 
and also analyzed the system performance [19]. However, the performance of 
the proposed scheme in proposed scenarios has not been presented, they 
only presented the CP-ABE algorithm performance in mobile devices. 
[15] proposed design of a new multi-tier adaptive military MANET 
security protocol using hybrid cryptography and signcryption. The proposed 
design offered three main protocols : cryptographic methods used in 
MANETs, hybrid key management protocols and structural organization of 
the military MANETs. The authors mentioned that they used the hybrid 
cryptography mechanisms and ECPVSS (Elliptic Curve Pintsov Vanstone 
Signature Scheme) that provided security and performance advantages when 
compared to some traditional cryptographic methods. However, the 
proposed scheme only fulfilled the confidentiality, integrity and 
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authentication features on the information sharing scheme. In fact, privacy is 
indispensable in military operations with high mobility and freely medium. 
Furthermore, access restrictions using access control mechanism is also 
required. 
ABE (Attribute Based Encryption) [6] is a new approach for encrypted 
access control. It offers security and access control. CP-ABE (Ciphertext-
Policy Attribute-Based Encryption) [3] is one of variant of ABE algorithm. CP-
ABE is a reliable asymmetric encryption mechanism that provides features to 
hide the user personal data by utilizing insensitive user attributes as user 
identity. In CP-ABE, The recipient only can decrypt if and only if the attribute 
set of his private key matches with the specified policy in the ciphertext. CP-
ABE is appropriate for most applications, like for data exchange over wireless 
medium[4], Secure content exchange in DTN (Delay Tolerant Network)[5][7]. 
However, the CP-ABE algorihm is not supported data integrity service. 
  In this paper, we extend our previous work [4], by proposing a secure 
data exchange over wireless medium using CP-ABE in the military case study. 
In this work, we consider for constructing a security system in MANETs for 
military operation with enabling secure adhoc routing at network layer and 
information exchange at application layer. In order to secure network layer, 
we utilize S-OLSR (Secure Optimized Link State Routing) with coverthe 
security requirements : the authenticity ofthe other node and the integrity of 
the routing packets. In military operations, not only ensure the routing 
protocol, but also the confidentiality of information and the privacy 
protection of the identities of the participating nodes.  Hence, for securing the 
application layer we consider any security requirements : data integrity, data 
confidentiality, authentication, access control and user privacy. To provide it, 
we choose CP-ABE algorithm which has advantages in access control and 
privacy features. The proposed scheme providesdata integrity, data 
confidentiality, and authentication services simultaneously. Data integrity 
and authentication are obtained through an added HMACscheme in 
encryption and decryption phases,  respectively [4]. Then, we have reviewed 
its method and found the weakness ofthe potential vulnerability hole. The 
message authentication code MAC, one of the component outputs from 
encryption phase  is sent in plaintext form. Therefore, in this paper, we 
enhance the security level by combining with symmetric cryptography 
technique. Thus, the output information which would be delivered through 
wireless link to the destination in ciphertext mode. In addition, we also 
propose different scenarios in battlefield implementation along with four 
protocols for implementingthe proposed system.Then, we evaluate the 
implementation of the proposed scheme in the real environment with 
embedded devices represented as participants to show the effectiveness of 
our system. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe 
authenticated CP-ABE as our previous work. Then, in Section3, we explain 
our adopted cryptographic scheme to construct our security goals. In Section 
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4, we explain our security requirements of the proposed scheme. In Section 5, 
we explain the detail of our proposed secure information exchange in MANET 
along with scenarios and protocols for implementation. Then, in Section 6, 
we present the implementation of our proposed scheme, experimental 
results and analysis. Finally, in Section 7 we express the conclusion and 
future works. 
 
2. PREVIOUS WORK 
In this section, we review an Authenticated-CPABE algorithm was 
developed in our previous work[4]. It supported access control and 
anonymity features by utilizing in sensitive user attributes as user identity. It 
has four functions, include Setup, Key Generation, Encryption, and 
Decryption. The access policy structure is related to the set of user attributes 
which are embedded in the secret key user SK. The access policy that 
presented by any monotonic access tree is linked with encrypted data, even if 
over radio link medium which is not secret, the confidentiality of data cannot 
be revealed. Only when the set of attributes associated with the decryption 
key corresponding with the access policy, the user will be able to decrypt the 
ciphertext CT and get back the plaintext M. This work provided data integrity, 
data confidentiality, and authentication services simultaneously. 
 
Figure 1. Authenticated CP-ABE construction [4] 
 The constructions of Authenticated-CP ABE consists of four phases 
includes setup, key generation,encryption and decryption. We adopt Setup 
and KeyGen algorithm from CP-ABE scheme [3]. The detail about this 
algorithm described in Figure 1. 
Setup (PK, MK):On input a security parameter, this phase is performed 
within the user who acts to generate the public keysPK for all users and a 
master key MK, which is used for key generation and kept private. PK will be 
used for encryption and decryption mechanisms while MK will be functioned 
for generating user’s secret keys SK. Firstly, we choose and let  be a 
bilinear group of prime order , and let  be a generator of . In addition let 
a bilinear map  : . 
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 (1) 
 (2) 
 
KeyGen (PK, MK, Att):This phase actkey generation scheme. Key generation 
for a user requires two parameters, the MK, as well as Att the set of attributes 
that the user possesses. The attributes are insensitively. The output is a SK 
for the user. That’s associated with Att. SK is generated by selecting a random 
and operated for each attribute of user. 
 
 (3) 
 
Encryption (PK, M, τ, K):This phase is run by all participating users who will 
act as an encryptor. Encryption algorithm encrypts a message M under an 
access policy τ which represents the attributes needed for decryption 
process. We utilize HMAC scheme with shared key K to enable authentication 
and data integrity service.So, data confidentiality, data integrity and 
authentication fulfilled simultaneously. It outputs a CT concatenate with MAC 
which are computed as: 
 
 (4) 
 
Decryption (PK, CT, SK, K):Decryption occurs when a user with personal key 
SK wishes to decrypt the ciphertext represented by CT. Decryption is the 
second step process, withthe first decrypting the message to determine if the 
ciphertext’s access tree τis satisfied by the user’s properties within SK, and 
the second performing the verification of the message integrity MAC. This 
algorithm is operated by all participating users who act as a decryptor. On 
input a CT, a secret key SK. If and only if Att = τand checking result of MAC is 
true. The message can be recovered to original message M, and error symbol 
┴ otherwise. It computed as : 
 
 
 
 
3. ADOPTED CRYPTOGRAPHIC SCHEME 
We adopt CP-ABE scheme [3], the symmetric encryption and message 
authentication [2] in our proposed secure information exchange in mobile 
ad-hoc network. 
 
(5) 
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3.1 Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme 
In the CP-ABE scheme [3], a message M is encrypted using public key 
PK and an access policy that associated with attributes. The access policy is 
expressed by a logical relation on attributes. Each node has a set of attributes 
which expressed node’s insensitively information like shown in Figure 2. The 
SKis issued by a trusted party,such as KGS (Key Generator Server). Then, the 
CT can be decrypted based on the matching of the access policy and the SK. 
Only the nodes who have attributes matched with the access policy are able 
to successfully decrypt and get back the original M.  In the CP-ABE scheme, 
there are four algorithms as follows: 
 
Figure 2. The fundamental of CP-ABE system [3] 
Setup:On input a security parameter, this algorithm randomly outputs the PK 
and MK which is kept private. PK will be published for encryption and 
decryption mechanisms, while MK will be operated for generating user’s 
secret keys SK. 
KeyGen:On input the system PK, MK and attribute list of userS. User request 
SK to KGS by issued their attributes S. KGS executed this algorithm. It outputs 
a SK for user. 
Encryption: On given message M, an access policy of attributes T, and the 
public parameters PK, it randomly computes a CT. This algorithm is 
performed by all participating users in the system who will act as an 
encryptor. 
Decryption: On given CT and a secret key SKi bound to a set of attributes Si, 
user who has Si matching to the attribute policy T associated with CT is able 
to recover the original message M.   
 
3.2 Symmetric Encryption and Message Authentication 
As well as our previous work [3], For the fastness and strength of 
encryption and message integrity, we adopt the symmetric encryption and 
message authentication scheme [2]. HMAC is used for checking the integrity 
of the exchanged messages. We utilize HMAC as the concrete instance of MAC. 
We utilize AES-256 to enhancedata confidentiality and HMAC-SHA256 to 
satisfy the data integrity of the exchanged data. 
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4. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS  
We define the expected goals that we want to achieve in our proposed 
security system in Mobile Ad-hocNetworks as follows: 
4.1 Secure Ad-hoc Routing 
Since the absence of a fixed infrastructure and central party, routing 
protocol in MANET be critical and vulnerable to some attacks, like described 
in Table 1. In order to prevent such attacks, it is important for the node to 
verify the authenticity of the other node and the integrity of the routing 
packets. In this work, we consider some security requirements to ensure the 
security of discovering routes and maintenance as follows :  
Source Authentication :It ensures only authorized nodes are able to 
perform on the network. Nodes need to claimed and verified as authorized 
nodes. Without authentication mechanism, an adversary could masquerade a 
node, thus gaining unauthorized access toresources and sensitive 
information and interfering with the operation of other nodes. 
Integrity : It ensures to keep the routing information from illegallynodes. 
Nodes need to be able to verify that the routing information is sent from 
legally nodes. 
4.2 Secure Information Exchange 
In MANET, the adversaries do not only attack adhoc routing. Data as 
payload also vulnerable from some some attacks such as modification, 
dropping and so on like described in Table 1. Here, we consider some 
security requirements berequired for constructing security system for 
information exchange in MANET as follows: 
Data Integrity: No one user is able to access or modify, delete and reply the 
confidential data. It means the confidential data is guaranteed, safeguarding 
correctness of information. 
Data Confidentiality: No one user is able to recover the original data, except 
the right users whose have a match attribute policy can decrypt the 
ciphertext. It means the exchange of the confidential data is kept undisclosed 
to others. 
Authentication: It assurance that participants are authorized users. 
Communication participants must prove their identities to ensure the 
authenticity. If there is not an authentication mechanism, the adversary could 
act as the right user in that communication and thus get access to confidential 
data, or even spread some fake messages to disturb the network. 
Access Control : It manages how people may access confidential data or 
other information using permission sets which allowing users access to 
information, namely access policy. 
User Privacy/Anonymity :All privacy information is closely related to 
identity the owner should be kept private by the user itself and not be 
exposed to other. 
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5. PROPOSED SECURE INFORMATION EXCHANGE  
 In this section, we describe our proposed secure information 
exchange system in the scenario of military battlefield. 
 
5.1 Our Approach 
CP-ABE Algorithm
AES Algorithm 
CT2
dec
MACCT1
MACCT1
H
dec
M
MAC
?
enc
M
H
Pk
T
MACCT1
MACCT1
enc
CT2
Sk
KY
KX
KX
KY
DecryptionEncryption
 
Figure 3. Our approach scheme 
We have observed and reviewed our previous work [4] that in there 
occur a security hole that makes it vulnerable to attack. In that system, MAC 
as the output component from encryption phase which deliver to the receiver 
side in plaintext form like shown in Figure 2. If MITM can access the network 
and success to modify the MAC, the receiver will never get the correct data 
integrity. Consequently, receiver always feels that received data from invalid 
user. To solve that’s problem, in this paper we propose to combine 
Authenticated-CPABE into AES to enhance the security level.The outputof 
Authenticated-CPABE will be encrypted by AES with shared key K. Then, 
message in ciphertext mode is transferred to the destination. In our 
implementation, we utilize AES with 256 bit key size to fulfill the security 
flaws and overcome the weaknesses of our previous approach. 
As shown in Figure 3, the output information which would be 
delivered through a wireless link to the destination in ciphertext mode. As 
well as our previous work [4], we adopt setup and KeyGen algorithm from 
CP-ABE scheme [3]. The changed construction from Authenticated-CPABE 
algorithm in encryption and decryption phase. The first steps, running 
Authenticated-CPABE. Sender encrypts the message M using Authenticated-
CPABE EncAuth-CPABE(PK, T, M, KX). It outputs CT1 concatenate with MAC. The 
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second steps, run AES encryption algorithm for encrypting the output from 
previous step with 256-bit shared symmetric key KY and resulting 
CT2=EncAES(EncAuth-CPABE(PK, T, M, KX), KY)what deliver to receiver through 
radio link. It’s computed as : 
 (6) 
The receiver receivesCT2 and decrypt it to get back the message 
M.Firstly, decrypt the CT2 uses AES and resulting CT1CT1=DecAES(DecAuth-
CPABE(PK, T, M, KX), KY).Then, get back the message M using Authenticated-
CPABE DecAuth-CPABE(PK, T, M, KX).It’s computed as :  
 
5.2 Security System 
A MANET provides network connectivity between mobile nodes over 
potentially multihop wireless channels mainly through link-layer protocols 
that ensure one-hop connectivity, and network-layer protocols that extend 
the connectivity to multiple hops. These distributed protocolstypically 
assume that all nodes are cooperative inthe coordination process. This 
assumption is unfortunately not true in a hostile environment. Because 
cooperation is assumed but not enforced in MANETs, malicious attackers can 
easily disrupt network operations by violating protocol specifications. 
We consider to implement our proposed scheme in a military 
environment. This military case study shows a battlefield in unknown 
territory, where infrastructure deployment is hard to achieve or maintain, 
therefore, MANET will be the perfect solution to such a scenario. As known, 
the military domain is a very challenging environment described by 
ambiguity and the need to be able to deal with significant anddisruptive 
dynamic changes. The military system goal is mainly concerned with the 
ability to satisfy a secure tactical information exchange for its environment, 
because the enemies are always trying their best to break down or destroy 
our activities. In a military consisting of different corps. Each one includes 
different elements, starting from a soldier to the commander-in-chief 
(officer).Military officer belonging to different categories (Captain, 
Lieutenants, Sergeants, Corporals, Soldier etc.) are divided into subgroups. 
Higher level officials can have access to the communication between its 
descendant lower level subgroups. Usually in the military, the officers will 
have a specific hierarchy, in which each officer will have the authority to give 
orders or to communicate with different elements based on his/her military 
ranking in the system. 
(7) 
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Figure 4. Proposed military case study scheme 
 
The scenario used in this case study is in a simple war mission based 
on general operation [14] which involve higher level official, Captain as 
command center,  lower level Lieutenant and soldiers. Captain as command 
center gives instructions orcommands fromoutside of battlefield to the 
lieutenantwho are in the same range. Then, lieutenant selecting commands 
from the captain, and forward that commands what addressed to the soldier 
by generated a new message with specific access policy. Our proposed 
scheme involves three parties: Captain, Lieutenant, and Soldiers like shown 
in Figure 4. All parties have the opportunity to act as an encryptor and 
decryptorfor exchanging information in a single hop and multi hop 
communication mode. Some confidential information may share in battlefield 
such as, strategy, tactics or commands from higher level official, ammunition 
status or health conditions from all parties in battlefield. 
 
Captain.The entity who acts as Key Authority to generate all symmetric keys 
K and distributes to another participant in its below level. On other hand, 
Captain is a command center, all of commands related to war mission issued 
by captain. 
Lieutenant. The entity who leads the soldiers in the battlefield area in a war 
mission. Lieutenant is one level below of captain. The lieutenant and captain 
are in within range, so theycan communicate directly without going through 
any intermediary. 
Soldiers.The front-end parties.Itis the lower level office who face to face with 
the enemy. The soldiers communicate with the others in multi hop mode. 
 
We define four protocols for implementation our proposed scheme : 
setup protocol, symmetric key distribution protocol, join and path 
establishment protocol and information sharing protocol.  
Setup protocol. To act this protocol, we involve other entity out of 
participants, KGS. This protocol executed setup and key generation phases 
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which executed before MANET established. Setup and Keygen protocol 
areexecuted before MANET established with assume KGS and all participants 
within range of the network. This phase is illustrated in Figure5. We assume 
that there are secure and reliable communication channels within range of 
network between KGS and other parties during initial key setup and 
generation phases.We adopt the Setup and KeyGen algorithm of CP-ABE 
scheme [3]. Firstly, KGS operates setup algorithm which resulting MK and PK. 
Then, users who want to participate request their SK by attaching a set of 
user attributes Att. The attributes include corps, military rank level, position, 
and area. Based on the user attributes, KGS act KeyGen algorithm to generate 
each user secret key SK. Then distribute the public key PK and secret key of 
each user SK-i. 
Next, We denote that Gateway (GW)representsas Captain, Node 
Coordinator (Co)representsas Lieutenant, and Node 1 until Node n represent 
as soldiers. 
Attributes Att:
- Corps
- Military rank level
- Position
- Area
Att-N2Att-N1Att-CoAtt-GW
KGS
Co Node-1 Node-2 Node-n
MK, PK
GW
A
tt
- G
W A
tt
-N
n
Att-Nn
 
Figure 5. Illustration of the key generation phase. 
 
Symmetric keys distribution protocol. In this section, the details of the 
proposed key distributionare presented. In the proposed key distribution, 
the goal is distributes symmetric keys to all authorized participating nodes as 
illustrated in Figure 6. This phase is executed on pre-processing with assume 
KGS and all participants within range of the network.  In our system, we use 
different types of key to protect private content and control content access. 
There are four types of keys : 
1. KA : it is a 128-bit shared key PSK (Pre-Shared-Key) created by a user, 
used for user authentication joining the network in link layer based 
on WPA2-PSK-AES protocol. 
2. KB : it is a 128-bit shared key for HMAC-MD5 operation, used for 
routing packet authentication in network layer based on S-OLSR 
protocol. 
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3. KC : it is a 256-bit shared key for HMAC-SHA256  operation to fulfill 
data integrity and authentication services. 
4. KD : it is a 256-bit shared symmetric key generated for AES encryption 
and decryption phases. 
In this protocol,we adopt the encryption and decryption algorithms of 
CP-ABE scheme [3]. GW as Key Authority generates the symmetric keysK (KA, 
KB, KC, KD). Then, distribute the symmetric keysK securely using CP-ABE with 
the defined access policy. The symmetric keysK (KA, KB, KC, KD) are encrypted 
using CP-ABE with the access policyT1 to all participants (Co, Node 1, Node 2 
until Node n). GW creates a ciphertext CTK= EncCP-ABE (PK, T1, K), where EncCP-
ABE is the CP-ABE Encryption algorithm, and the access policy of attributes T1. 
The Access policy T1 structure as shown in Figure 7 can be represented as:  
 
T1 = ((‘SOLDIER’ AND ‘ARMY’) OR(‘LIEUTENANT’ OR ‘CAPTAIN’)) 
 
Figure 6.  Illustration of symmetric keydistribution  
 
 
Figure 7.  Access policy T1 structure for symmetric keys distribution 
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After receiving CTK, all authorized participantswhich satisfy the access 
policy T1 can decrypt it to obtain the shared symmetric key Kusing CP-ABE 
Decryption algorithm.  
 
Join and Path establishment protocol. By using the symmetric key KA 
which obtained from the symmetric key distribution protocol, the joining 
participants will be ableto authenticate and claim as the legitimate 
participants to join a network which is applied WPA2-PSK-AES security 
system. After successfully joined in a network, participants are member of 
that network and connection established. The next step is path establishment 
phase. To establish a route towards the destination securely, we utilize S-
OLSR protocol [11] which illustrated in Figure 8. Routing packets are 
distributed along with signature to ensure the integrity of routing packet and 
source authentication and time stamp to ensure the freshness of routing 
table and to prevent reply attack. Participants who have key KB which from 
symmetric key distribution phase can authenticate and verify the packets 
hop-by-hop until the path is established.Only authorized participants can 
update the routing tables. Hence, in the established path, users can 
communicate and share any content with others privately. 
TSPacket Sign.1
TSPacket Sign.2
TSPacket Sign.3
TSPacket Sign.3
Node 2
Node 3Co
Node 1
TSPacket Sign.2
TSPacket Sign.1
 
Figure 8.  Illustration of path establishment phase based on S-OLSR  
Information exchange protocol. This phase is only executed by all 
participants in the established path from source to destination. With the 
proposed security architecture like shown in Figure 3 we maintain and 
protect the data with fulfill some security services as described before. To 
cover our proposed security scheme and to highlight the implementation of 
secure information exchange mechanism in battlefield that described in 
above, we define different scenarios for exchanging information in a single 
hop and multi hop communication mode: 
First Scenario.We consider that this scenario representedasingle hop 
communication. In this scenario, we assume that gateway GW and node 
coordinator Co within their range. Gateway as captaincan deliver some 
strategics command to node coordinatoras one below level official of 
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gateway directly without multiple relaying mechanism.In here, GW as 
command center act as encryptor. GWencrypts the commandM using the 
defined access policy T2CTM = EncAES(EncAuth-CPABE(PK, T2, M, KC), KD) and sends 
the ciphertext CTMto a specific destination, Co. The data are transmitted via 
the established path. After receiving the encrypted data CTM from GW, Co 
decrypts it to get back the original messageM.The access policy T2 like shown 
in Figure 10 is represented as: 
 
T2 = (((‘ARMY’ AND ‘BATALYON.A’) AND ‘LIEUTENANT’)OR‘CAPTAIN‘) 
 
 
Figure 9.  Access policy T2 structure for information exchange in single hop mode. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Experimental design of secure information exchange in single hop mode 
 
Second Scenario.We consider that this scenario represented multi hop 
communication. In this scenario, sometimes a soldier run out of the ammo or 
shot, so make that the health condition dropped. Soldiers ask for help by 
sending confidentials message to other soldiers, and the leader in battlefiled, 
a lieutenant. In here, Node 3 act as encryptor. Node 3encrypts the messageM 
using the defined access policy T3CTM = EncAES(EncAuth-CPABE(PK, T3, M, KC), KD) 
and sends the ciphertext CTMto theothers who satisfy the access policy T3. 
The encrypted messageCTMis transmitted via the established path. After 
receiving the encrypted messageCTM, Node 1, Node 2 and Codecrypt it to get 
back the original messageM.The access policy T3 like shown in Figure 10 is 
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represented as: 
T3 = ((‘SOLDIER’ AND ‘ARMY’) OR ‘LIEUTENANT’) 
 
Figure 11. Experimental design of secure information exchange in multi hop mode 
 
 
Figure 12. Access policy T3 structure for information exchange in multi hop mode. 
 
6. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL MEASUREMENTS 
In this section, we describe our implementation of proposed secure 
information exchange in military environment and present the experimental 
results to confirm theeffectiveness of our proposed security scheme. 
Act as participants in our implementation, We involve five mobile 
devices, act as gateway GW, node coordinator Co, and soldiers  Node1, Node 2 
and Node 3 . In our experiment, we use Laptop PC acts as GW and Fit-PC2i 
embedded computing and raspberry pi3 act as Co and Node1, Node 2, and 
Node 3. Moreover, the specification of Laptop PC, Fit-pc2i and raspberry pi3 
are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Hardware and Software Used in Experiment 
Gateway GW 
Node Coordinator Co 
& Node 3 
Node1&Node 2 
Laptop, Intel Core i3 
2.4GHz, RAM 4GBDDR3, 
Wifi 802.11b/g/n, 
LinuxDebian kernel-3.5.0-
17,  
gcc-4.7.2, gmp-5.1.1,pbc-
lib-0.5.14, glib-
2.34,openssl-1.0.1e, olsrd-
0.9.0.3, s-olsr v.5. 
Fit-pc2i, intel atom 
1.6GHZ, RAM 2GB, Linux 
mint kernel-3.2.0-99, 
WLAN 802.11n,gcc-
4.7.2, gmp-6.0.0, 
pbc-lib-0.5.14, glib-
2.34,openssl-1.0.1e, 
olsrd-0.9.0.3, s-olsr v.5. 
Raspberry pi3, armv7l 
1.2GHz, RAM 1GB, 
Raspbian Wheezy 
4.1.19,WLAN 802.11n, 
gcc-4.7.2, gmp-6.0.0, 
pbc-lib-0.5.14, glib-
2.34,openssl-1.0.1e, 
olsrd-0.9.0.3, s-olsr v.5. 
 
 
Figure 13. Implementation of secure symmetric key distribution 
 
Figure 14. Implementation of secure information exchange system 
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Our implementation was built on native C programming. We adopted 
a middleware for the proposed scheme which is implemented on the 
PBC(Pairing-Based Cryptography) library. The PBC library[20] is for the 
pairing system and underlying ECC computations used in CP-ABE. The 
implementation of symmetric key distribution, and information exchange 
shown in Figure 13, and Figure 14. We implemented our proposed security 
scheme practically in around of PENS campus with the environment and the 
placement of nodes like shown in Figure 15. 
In this work, we examined the proposed security scheme with 
measured the performance of our proposed security scheme in three main 
phases of the implemented system. 
 
 
Figure 15. Test bed location and nodes placement 
 
 
Figure 16. Time measurement of symmetric key K distribution 
 
 
91 m 90 m 88 m 
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Measurement for Symmetric Key Distribution Phase  
We measured the time consumption of symmetric key distribution 
phase. Gateway GW distributed the shared symmetric key K to all 
participants, Node Coordinator Co, Node 1, Node 2 and Node 3. The size of 
the shared symmetric key K and ciphertext are 96 Bytes and 1,555 Bytes, 
respectively. The scenario of time measurement for symmetric key K 
distribution is shown in Figure 16. The t0 is the time of CP-ABE encryption of 
symmetric key K on GW. The t1, t2, t3, and t4 are communication time to 
propagate encrypted key CTK through IEEE802.11n Wireless connection. 
Meanwhile t5, t6, t7, and t8 are the time of CP-ABE decryption to extract and 
store the symmetric key K on Co, Node 1, Node 2, and Node 3, respectively. 
The total process of symmetric key distribution takes about 2,532ms, which 
is an accumulation of t0 to t8. The time of CP-ABE encryption for KwithT1 is 
about 50.102 ms, the transmission time of CTK is about 478ms, and CP-ABE 
decryption time for recovering Kt5,t6,t7, and t8 are about 100 ms,179.839 
ms, 179.839 ms and 100 ms respectively. 
 
Measurement for Path Establishment Phase  
We measured the processing times for updating the routing table 
based on S-OLSR protocol until the path established with the topology 
scenario shown in Figure 17. We assume that Co is the routing-initiator node. 
The total time of routing message exchange on 3-hop until the path 
established is about 997ms. 
 
Figure 17.Path establishment topology 
 
Measurement for Information Exchange Phase 
We measured the time consumption of information exchange phase 
with different message sizes and types in different scenarios. The size of 
shared informations in batlefield area relatively not so big. There is possible 
that the informations in image type, for example photo of battlefield 
condition.We measured the time consumption with 50Bytes, and 1000Bytes 
text data type and image data type. Table 3 shows the total times of 
transferring various types of data with first scenario in single hop mode 
using proposed scheme based on access policy T2. The encrypted Information 
Exchangeprocess illustrated in Figure 10. 
After establishing the path, we transfer various data using two 
scenarios which represented single hop and multi hop communication mode. 
With the first scenario, where GW and Co are within their ranges, To 
exchange a text file with size 50 Bytes, it totally takes about 690ms, which 
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consists of about 40.076 ms for the CP-ABE encryption at GW, about 470ms 
for the transmission, and about 180.374 ms for the CP-ABE decryption at the 
Co. The encryption time and decryption time are relatively stable, even for 
exchanging the text file with data size1,000 Bytes. These take 50.742 ms and 
190.649 ms, respectively. However, the transmission time becomes 713ms. To 
exchange the image file with 2,256,451Bytes takes about 4,874 ms, where the 
encryption time and decryption time are about 120.613 ms and 520.263 ms, 
respectively. Meanwhile, the transmission time takes 4,233ms.The increases 
of ciphertext size for this scenario is around 1,520 Bytes like shown in Figure 
18. 
Table 3. Processing times for exchanging various datain the first scenario 
 Original data size, 
encrypted data size 
Encryption, 
transmission, 
decryption, 
times (ms) 
Total processing 
time (ms) 
Text file 
50 Bytes, 
1,573 Bytes 
40.076 
470 
180.374 
690.450 
1,000 Bytes, 
2,517 Bytes 
50.742 
713 
190.649 
954.388 
Image file 
2,256,451 Bytes, 
2,257,973 Bytes 
120.613 
4,233 
520.263 
4,873.876 
 
Table 4. Processing times for exchanging various data in the second scenario 
Original data size, 
encrypted data size 
Encryption, 
transmission, 
decryption, 
times (ms) 
Total processing 
time (ms) 
Text file 
50 Bytes, 
1,280 Bytes 
290.133 
1,290 
160.421 
1,740.554 
1,000 Bytes, 
2,224 Bytes 
300.830 
2,976 
170.746 
3,447.576 
Image file 
2,256,451 Bytes, 
2,257,680 Bytes 
520.563 
12,118 
480.131 
13,118.694 
 
For the second scenario, we measured the time consumption of 
information exchange in multi hop communication mode with experimental 
design like shown in Figure 11. Node 3 wants to share information to Co (3-
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hop). To exchange a text file with size 50 Bytes, it totally takes about 1,741ms, 
which consists of about 290.133 ms for the CP-ABE encryption at Node 3, 
about 1,290ms for the transmission, and about 160.421 ms for the CP-ABE 
decryption at the Co. The encryption time and decryption time are relatively 
stable, even for exchanging the text file with data size 1,000 Bytes. These take 
300.830 ms and 170.746 ms, respectively. However, the transmission time 
becomes 2,976ms. To exchange the image file with 2,256,451Bytes takes 
about 13,119ms, where the encryption time and decryption time are about 
520.563 ms and 480.131 ms, respectively. Meanwhile, the transmission time 
takes 12,118 ms. The increases of ciphertext size for this scenario is around 
1,227 Bytes like shown in Figure 18. 
Table 5. Processing times for exchanging various data in other possibilities 
 
Original data 
size, 
encrypted data 
size 
Encryption, 
transmission, 
decryption, 
times (ms) 
Total 
processing 
time (ms) 
Encryption, 
transmission, 
decryption, 
times (ms) 
Total 
processing 
time (ms) 
Co-Node 1 (1-hop) Co-Node 2 (2-hop) 
T
e
x
t 
50 Bytes, 
1,280 Bytes 
290.133 
457 
159.646 
906.779 
290.133 
890 
159.646 
1,339.779 
1,000 Bytes, 
2,224 Bytes 
300.830 
715 
168.490 
1,184.320 
300.830 
1,376 
168.490 
1,845.320 
Im
a
g
e
 
2,256,451 Bytes, 
2,257,680 Bytes 
520.563 
4,233 
359.636 
5,113.199 
520.563 
8,118 
359.636 
8,998.199 
 Node 1-Node 2 (1-hop) Node 1-Node 3 (2-hop) 
T
e
x
t 
50 Bytes, 
1,280Bytes 
190.073 
452 
159.646 
801.719 
190.073 
895 
160.421 
1,245.494 
1,000 Bytes, 
2,224Bytes 
292.433 
705 
168.490 
1,165.923 
292.433 
1,382 
170.746 
1,845.179 
Im
a
g
e
 
2,256,451 Bytes, 
2,257,680 Bytes 
338.726 
4,233 
359.636 
4,931.362 
338.726 
8,120 
480.131 
8,938.857 
 Node 2-Node 3 (1-hop) Co-Node 3 (3-hop) 
T
e
x
t 
50 Bytes, 
1,280Bytes 
190.073 
461 
160.421 
811.495 
290.133 
1,290 
160.421 
1,740.554 
1,000 Bytes, 
2,224Bytes 
292.433 
719 
170.746 
1,182.179 
300.830 
2,976 
170.746 
3,447.576 
Im
a
g
e
 
2,256,451 Bytes, 
2,257,680 Bytes 
338.726 
4,240 
480.131 
5,058.857 
520.563 
12,118 
480.131 
13,118.694 
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As the defined access policy T3, users who can decrypt the ciphertext 
CTM are soldiers and lieutenant. So, there are several possibilities for data 
exchange scheme, both among soldiers and soldier with lieutenant. Table 5 
displays the times for exchanging various data in other possibilities. As 
shown in Table 3, 4 and 5, the transmission time increases as the exchanged 
data is larger. Table 6 and 7 show the performance of encryption time and 
decryption time of 50 Bytes data. The additional of HMAC and AES schemes 
using processor 1.2GHz only take processing time about 4.452 ms, we can 
confirm that our approach by using CP-ABE with added HMAC and AES 
schemes make low overhead. 
 
Table 6. Performance of the encryption time of 50 Bytes data 
Type of Devices 
Processing time (ms) 
Total (ms) 
CP-ABE HMAC-256 AES-256 
Laptop 39.317 0.036 0,724 40.076 
Fit-PC2i 288.229 0.538 1.366 290.133 
Raspberry pi3 188.184 0.533 1.356 190.073 
 
Table 7. Performance of the decryption time of 50 Bytes data 
Type of Devices 
Processing time (ms) 
Total (ms) 
CP-ABE HMAC-256 AES-256 
Laptop 19.269 0.035 0.988 20.292 
Fit-PC2i 157.749 0.536 2.136 160.421 
Raspberry pi3 157.085 0.533 2.028 159.646 
 
 
 
Figure 18. The increasing size of ciphertext  
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Table 8 shows the comparison between the design of the proposed 
scheme and related works based on some parameters : security 
requirements, key distribution protocol, realization, mode and secure layer.  
 
Table 8. Comparison between the design of the proposed scheme and related works 
 
[15]  [19] Proposed Scheme 
S
e
cu
ri
ty
 r
e
q
u
ir
e
m
e
n
ts
 Data Integrity yes no yes 
Data 
Confidentiality 
yes 
yes 
yes 
Authentication yes  yes yes  
Access Control no yes yes 
User Privacy no yes yes 
Key Distribution 
Protocol 
yes yes yes 
Realization Design Real test bed Real test Bed 
Mode Multi hop Multi hop 
Single hop and 
multi hop 
Secure layer 
Application 
layer 
Network layer 
Network and 
application layers 
 
Assume there is a MITM (Meet In The Middle) between the 
communicating nodes which potentially for intercepting and compromising 
the messages sent. In the set up of the communication between nodes, it is 
required to have shared key KA and KB for joining the secured network 
WPA2-PSK-AES and S-OLSR based. So, the network is only decrypted and 
authenticated by nodes who have KA and KB for joining the network. A MITM 
may not only passively intercept the communication, but also actively attacks 
such as access, modificate, or remove the content of the communication. Even 
if this phase can be penetrated and then he has KD to decrypt the ciphertext 
CT2, he would feel cheated or deceived because he cannot read the 
confidential message, only get the ciphertext form CT1 from the real 
confidential message. So, If the message from the nodes is encrypted with PK 
and KC, then the message is only decrypted with the corresponding key, SK 
and Kc. Because theSK only owned by the legitimated node which makes it 
impossible for attacker to decrypt a message without have any additional 
information like the registered user attributes and the access policy used. 
Although this system can be used to prevent the threat of attacks and fairly 
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safe, but it is still evaluated on the current scenarios of implementations and 
the current conditionof devices. Moreover, an absolutely secure system 
cannot be reached and the threat for security system always keep abreast. 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
We have presented a secure communication information exchange in 
Mobile Adhoc Network (MANET) system and its implementation which offers 
secure in adhoc routing and information exchange. We also design protocols 
to implement the proposed scheme for various battlefield scenarios in real 
environment using embedded devices.The combination of Authenticated-
CPABE with the symmetric cryptography algorithm increase the robustness 
of the proposed secure model.The experimental results show the practicality 
of the proposed system in the current environment of embedded devices. The 
transmission time dominated of total processing time on the proposed 
security system. Experimental results show that the additional of HMAC and 
AES schemes using processor 1.2GHz only take processing time about 4.452 
ms,  we can confirm that our approach by using CP-ABE with added HMAC 
and AES schemes make low overhead. This system can be used to prevent the 
threat of attacks and fairly safe, but it is still evaluated on the current 
scenarios of implementations and the current conditionof devices. 
Our plans for future work include but are not limited to provide key 
management protocol, such as key renewal and revocation mechanisms. 
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